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Introduction 
In this paper I put forward some arguments in favor of external reason having caused the 
universe to exist reflecting the contemporary scientific knowledge describing the origin of the 
universe based on the Big Bang theory. The paper does not address theoretical, hypothetical or 
speculative models such as multiverse, oscillating universe, brane cosmology, or actualized 
many-worlds interpretation; it is solely based on the current scientifically well-confirmed and 
commonly accepted picture of the universe. 
I have been inspired by Quentin Smith’s article A Cosmological Argument of a Self-Caused 
Universe1 published in 2008, and I use a similar approach extending the ideas mentioned in the 
work. As regards the causality, the core of Quentin Smith’s argument for a self-caused universe 
is an infinite sequence of causally dependent events (states) in an open time-space interval 
starting from - but not including - the singularity. All states can formally be expressed in form of 
infinite sequence {. . . x → y → z . . .} where x causes y, y causes z, etc. Every state in the open 
sequence denotes an empirical event in the universe and is always preceded by another event 
that actually causes it to take into effect. Since the existence of each state is caused by an 
earlier state, and since the existence of all these states entails the universe's existence, there is 
an empirical explanation for each of these contingent beings. 
Although the assumption of infinite sequence of causal states is a bit debatable2, we can accept 
it for now. The problem is that even infinite sequence of causal states does not cover all states in 
the known history of the universe. The infinite sequence of causal states describes only 
empirical realm of the universe, that is, the phase of the universe since its empirical appearance 
after the big bang. The causal sequence does not reflect the existence of primordial singularity, 
and as such, it does not address the origin of the universe at all. If we even considered the 
infinite sequence of empirical states perfectly valid, it can only be applied to a specific phase of 
the universe already existing in its known empirical form, sidestepping the well-proved piece of 
scientific knowledge pointing out to the clearly recognized term of singularity. 
The singularity lies beyond time and space boundaries, so we cannot simply use words such as 
‘before’ or ‘after’ in terms of ordinary time notion. However, causality, as a principle, does not 
have to be necessarily restricted to such a frame; in fact, causality can also be applied whenever 
a state evolves from an earlier state. If it is possible to properly define the singularity as a state 
and make it different from empirical states it could also be possible to enrich the sequence by 
inserting it as a new state member. 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/quentin_smith/self-caused.html 
2
 In commonly accepted Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, detectable physical states are limited by quantum nature 
of time restricted by the smallest measurable time interval; the Planck time. If we adopt this approach then the overall number of 
causal states of finite number of elementary particles during limited time, though incredibly large, is still finite. It is to say, however, 
that this view is not commonly shared by philosophers for its pragmatic positivistic nature. 
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1. External Cause 
Widely used modern definitions of causality rely on empirical attributes such as time, space, 
observable states, regularity of occurrence or mutual interaction. Although external cause used 
in terms of primordial nonempirical cause is intuitively recognized, it does not seem to be 
sufficiently specified. When viewed from the perspective of standard definitions a significant 
difference becomes apparent - external cause is not initiated from what we could call empirical 
state. If it happened just once, it either does not meet the regularity-of-occurrence criterion. 
Furthermore, only ‘resulting effect’ can be observable, the ‘initial state’ is by definition beyond 
the empirical scope. Strictly spoken, external cause seems to violate most of requirements the 
common conception of causality should meet. Can it be considered a cause at all? 
If we adopted the view that external cause is in fact not a cause, we would have to conclude that 
the primordial expansion of the universe from the singularity (as a possible external cause) had 
been uncaused. This would contradict our deep-rooted intuition about general validity of 
causality, which would immediately result in exclusion of the singularity from further rational 
deliberation. If even it was initiated by a sort of ‘miracle’, we would still tacitly tend to 
comprehend it as a yet unknown cause or a result of some agens. In addition, the empirical 
effect of the singularity expansion was colossal; it manifested an enormous amount of 
observable matter, energy and the birth of time and space. The expansion demonstrated the 
presence of a strong force3 that brought fundamental physical categories to existence. The 
resulting effect of the force resembles similarly evolving physical processes (expansions), for 
which causation is naturally presupposed. In comparison to common understanding of causality, 
the only difference is a nonempirical initial state; the subsequent evolution of the singularity 
expansion is already subject to possibly fully describable causal physical process. 
In order to keep causality valid also in this case, it is necessary to generalize the usual meaning 
of empirical cause. In order to encompass nonempirical states, we have to restrict the tight 
connection to empirical observability. Despite this restriction, two key attributes typical for 
causality will still be kept - the state and ordered sequence of consequent states representing 
causal state chain. If initial state can be distinguished from consequent state, we will say that 
initial state evolved to consequent state and the initial state constitutes a cause. Furthermore, if 
the initial state is of nonempirical nature - it cannot be described in terms of physical categories - 
it constitutes external cause4.         (Ex) 
We will use the similar notation as for usual causal states 
{I → e} 
where I is the initial state (cause) and e consequent state (effect). Similarly, we can say that I 
and e are in causal relation, or I caused e. 
This generalization keeps causality meaningfully specified also in case when both states are not 
necessarily empirical. The remaining question is whether such understanding of causality is 
sufficient for description of singularity evolution. That is, whether it is possible to describe the 
singularity as a state distinguished from consequent empirical state such that both states share 
a common property that is subject to change. 
 
                                                          
3
 The strong force mentioned here is not a force in usual physical sense. This expression denotes an initial power that launched the 
primordial expansion from singularity and brought forth the manifestation of physical categories. 
4
 A cause linking two heterogeneous states (initial nonempirical state and consequent empirical effect) is capable of operating on 
nonempirical initial state prior to existence of empirical effect and cannot therefore be considered substantially empirical. Empirical 
cause requires both the states be empirical. 
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Note 
There is a position held by some scientists and philosophers that the primordial singularity 
should be excluded from causal-oriented deliberation, or even that the origin of the universe 
should be claimed uncaused. This view could perhaps be plausible if none important aspect of 
causality was applicable. But the state-change from initial to subsequent state (provided both the 
states are recognized and distinguished from each other) is one of the fundamental 
characteristics of causality regardless of substantial nature of the states. A hypothetical but 
conceptually valid example would be a sudden emergence of material object in empty space. 
The cause-effect states can be identified either with the object itself as a virtually nonexistent 
object brought to existence, or as an empty space changed to nonempty space filled with the 
emerging object. A natural reaction would be that some unknown cause operating under yet 
unknown conditions has actualized the material object. If we insisted on noncausal interpretation 
of the event when actually ‘something observable happened’, we would neglect the fact of 
apparently observed state-change pointing to a possible cause demonstrating one of its 
fundamental attributes5. Such a standpoint would therefore be premature and unjustified. 
Instead, it is better to weaken the requirements attributed to causality and keep those 
fundamental but more general, such as recognizable states and change of states in the cause-
effect relation, not requiring both states be necessarily empirically observable6. 
There are also some other situations indicating the necessity of more general comprehension of 
causality even in empirical realm7. 
 
2. The Singularity as a State 
As we have already mentioned, we cannot apply usual time and space categories for description 
of the singularity. In fact, there is not much to say about it as it inherently lies beyond the scope 
of empirical evidence. In contrast, all empirical states share a well-known common property - 
they operate within the matter-time-space frame in the universe and are driven by natural laws. 
We will shortly call this significant property empirical manifestation. Existence of empirical 
manifestation is exactly the property where the singularity state differs from the empirical state - 
empirical events are states with the empirical manifestation property defined, whereas the 
singularity constitutes a state having this property undefined. In the singularity, the usual 
physical categories such as matter, time and space have no meaning and the natural laws do 
not hold. In both states, the empirical manifestation is a mutually exclusive property. The 
existence of the same property shared by both states being subject to change is important for 
linking the states into possible causal relation in the means of generalized causality described in 
the previous section. This definition of singularity state also implies nonempirical nature of the 
state. 
                                                          
5
 The mentioned example is not fully representative in terms of the singularity state we are addressing for both the initial and the 
consequent states in the example are principally observable. However, although the singularity state cannot be observable, its 
existence and some important characteristics are derived from valid natural laws and supported by observation. 
6
 Obviously, at least one state in the cause-effect state pair (namely, the effect) must be empirically observable otherwise such a 
state-change would principally be unobservable and would just be subject to hypothetical or metaphysical suppositions. 
7
 A notable example is an experimentally confirmed EPR paradox. Two entangled particles with complementary states (e.g. spin) 
separated and localized in long distance still ‘know’ about each other. By randomly changing the state of one particle the state of the 
second one is immediately determined and actualized. This bizarre fact is known as ‘nonlocal realism’. In comparison to usual 
understanding of empirical causality, the ‘nonlocal causality’ circumvents mutual interaction requirement and bypasses time and 
space boundaries. The nonlocal causality appears to behave similarly as two-variable relation in ideal systems - a value change of 
one variable in the relation yields the change of the second variable value so that the relation remains valid. Instead of interaction or 
transmitting the causal signal in space and time, the particles seem rather to be acting to immediately satisfy the underlying relation 
(e.g. Pauli Exclusion Principle). The fundamental cause-effect characteristic of causality is still retained - the initial random change of 
the first particle state (cause) enforces the complementary state of the second particle (effect). 
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Such a defined singularity state has negative delimitation; it is not known what the singularity 
state was like, it is just known what it was not. But we know that such a state must have existed 
otherwise the existence of the empirical universe would not be limited, or in other words, the 
fundamental attributes of the universe would not be subject to change in any aspect. 
The singularity-state term is thus conceptually properly identified and distinguished from the 
empirical-state term. Its meaning can even be practically illustrated - if someone asks how the 
situation could look like twenty billion years ago, the answer would be ‘There was a state where 
the physical categories and the laws of empirical reality were not applicable; they didn’t make 
sense in the means of our empirical realm. As the question implicitly points out to a situation at 
some time, which itself is a physical category, the question has no meaning either.’ 
 
3. The Precedence of the Singularity State 
The question is what a relation between the singularity state and empirical state is like. Although 
the singularity state cannot be directly expressed in terms of time, we can consistently say that 
the singularity state preceded empirical states. More precisely, at any instant when an empirical 
state existed, the singularity state (not attributed with empirical manifestation) did obviously not 
exist - it had already been changed to empirical state. Since this is valid for any empirical state 
at any given time the singularity state had preceded all empirical states. Given this, we can 
construct a simple ordered sequence 
{S, x}            (1) 
where S denotes the singularity state and x is an arbitrary empirical state. S is therefore the very 
first nonempirical state8 prior to any ordered sequence of empirical states 
{S, . . . x → y → z . . .}         (2) 
 
4. The Singularity and External Causality 
The sequence (1) above shows that singularity state changed to empirical state. One state 
changed to a different state but the singularity is the only state out of which the universe 
emerged - the universe is therefore a consequent effect of the initial singularity state-change. In 
accordance with the causality principle described earlier there must have been a cause that had 
the initial singularity state changed. We can therefore claim that some cause linked S and x in 
causal relation so that S represents the initial state condition and x the effect 
{S → x}           (3) 
It is difficult to say whether any empirical state could be determined as immediate effect of the 
initial singularity state-change, if at all, but this is not so problematic. Because of transitivity of 
actual causal chain9, virtually any consequent state in the chain can be considered an effect of 
initial state. For example, given the validity of sequence (2), sequence {x → z} is a valid causal 
relation too. 
                                                          
8
 From the metaphysical point of view, it might well be conceptualized that the singularity itself is a structured domain with similar 
chains of causal states applicable in this domain too. However, metaphysical issues are not subject of this article and I simplify the 
concept of singularity as being a single atomic state that may cause solely empirical effects. 
9
 Although in general the relation between transitivity and causality is somewhat problematic, for actualized causal chain described in 
form of linear sequence of actually realized states such that every state is determined by the previous state, transitivity remains valid. 
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Without loss of generality we can therefore choose any early empirical states x, y, z in causal 
relation {x → y → z} and write 
{S → x → y → z . . .}          (4) 
Since S is the first and common state to all empirical causal sequences, we will call S a primary 
state or primary cause. 
 
But what was the primary cause like having caused such a dramatic change from a state where 
empirical reality had not been present towards the empirical universe? Could it be an empirical 
cause? 
Recall the sequence (4) stating that any empirical state in the primary causal chain is an effect of 
the causal change starting from the initial state S. But S is a nonempirical state (the singularity 
state) and by (Ex), S denotes external cause. 
Hence, we can conclude that the primary cause S had been an external primary cause. 
 
